

Dealing with the past and facing the future: Mediators of the effects of collective guilt and shame in Bosnia and Herzegovina

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Abstract

Two studies are reported which examined potential mediators of the effects of collective guilt and shame on reparation attitudes. Samples of young Bosnian Serbs (Ns = 173, 247) were asked to report their feelings of guilt and shame for what their group had done during the 1992–1995 war in Bosnia Herzegovina. They also reported their attitudes towards making reparation to Bosnian Muslims. Both collective guilt and shame positively predicted reparation attitudes, but these associations were differently mediated. The effects of guilt were mediated by empathy for the outgroup, while the effects of shame were mediated by self-pity and empathy. The theoretical and applied implications of these findings are discussed. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

‘Srebrenica fell to the Bosnian Serb army on 11 July 1995. What happened in the days after the Dutch peacekeepers withdrew from the town has been described as the worst atrocity in Europe since World War II. It is estimated that 23 000 women and children were deported from Srebrenica in the 30 hours after Bosnian Serb leader General Ratko Mladic entered the UN’s ‘safe area’. Muslim men aged between 12 and 77 were separated from their families for ‘interrogation’. Between 7000 and 8000 of them were killed and buried in mass graves in the enclave’ (BBC News, 2005).

The above incident, just one of many atrocities committed during the recent war years in former Yugoslavia, provides a tragic and graphic example of how one party to an intergroup conflict can perpetrate acts on another party which most observers would regard as immoral in the extreme. Occasionally, such illegitimate deeds can arouse feelings of guilt and shame in the hearts and minds of other members of the perpetrator group, even if they were not directly implicated in the deeds themselves (Barkan, 2000; Buruma, 1994; Steele, 1990). When this happens, it can give rise to political discussions about whether some form of restitution should be made to the victims of the misdeeds (Barkan, 2000). These phenomena—experiencing negative emotions on behalf of one’s group and then responding to those emotions in various ways—have been the focus of recent theorizing and research in social psychology (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002). In this paper, we attempt to make a contribution to this burgeoning research area by investigating the distinction between collective guilt and collective shame, and the nature of their respective associations with other group-based emotions and with intergroup attitudes. We do so in the context of relations between Serbs and Bosniaks¹ in Bosnia Herzegovina in the aftermath of the 1992–1995 war.

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¹‘Bosniak’ is the term usually used to refer to Bosnian Muslims.

GUILT AND SHAME AT AN INTERPERSONAL LEVEL

In the analysis of emotional responses to personal misdeeds Lewis' (1971) distinction between the self-conscious emotions of guilt and shame has proved influential. According to Lewis, both reactions involve negative affect but the focus differs: in guilt the emphasis is mainly on the wrong-doing and its consequences ('I did this bad thing to someone, who suffered as a result'), whilst shame is indicated by a focus on the implications of that wrongdoing for one's self-concept ('I did this bad thing to someone, and therefore I am a bad person'). Notice that though both emotions are self-conscious since they emanate from a perception of moral transgression, guilt, with its focus on the behaviour and its impact on the 'victim', has the potential to be more outward directed than shame. The latter emotion, because it is exclusively preoccupied with the negative implications of the misdeed for the self-concept, is much more likely to be inwardly directed (Tangney, Stueweg, & Mashek, 2007). Lewis (1971) speculated that since both emotions are aversive, people should try to alleviate them, but in different ways. Guilt, since it focuses on the misdeed should lead to attempts at restitution to the victim; shame, in contrast, with its inward focus, should be more likely to provoke avoidance.

These early writings stimulated much subsequent research into the nature and consequences of guilt and shame in interpersonal relations, most notably Tangney and Fischer (1995). One debated issue concerns the conceptualization of shame. Some have followed Lewis (1971) in regarding it as the distress experienced when one feels that the misdeed reveals some flaw in one's character and it is this sense of (moral) inferiority that generates an avoidance or withdrawal response (Tangney, 1991; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996). Others, though, have regarded shame as being more linked to the damage to one's reputation caused by the public exposure of the misdeeds (Smith, Webster, Parrott, & Eyre, 2002). In this second view, it is not so much any perceived defect in ourselves that is distressing as the feeling that others now think less of us. Smith et al. (2002) provided support for this 'reputational' view of shame by showing that shame was more likely to be evoked if people felt that their (mis)deeds were under public scrutiny than when they occurred in private. Since both kinds of shame involve a negative self-image, it is likely that they will ultimately generate a similar avoidance coping response. However, it is possible to imagine circumstances in which an effective strategy for dealing with the 'reputational' form of shame could be to make some public form of restitution to the 'victim' if, by doing so, one's image in the eyes of others could be improved.

A second issue concerns the correlates of guilt and shame. There is some consensus that empathy is more strongly correlated with guilt than with shame (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Hoffman, 1982; Leary, 2007; Tangney, 1991; Tangney et al., 2007; Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992). A plausible reason for this is that guilt focuses more on the misdeeds and their consequences for the victim while shame is oriented more inwardly to the consequences of the actions for one's self (image). The nature of the guilt-empathy link is still unclear however (Tangney, 1991). Hoffman (1982) and Baumeister et al. (1994) speculate that guilt *arises from* an empathic ability to recognize the distress in the other caused by one's actions. On the other hand, Tangney (1991, p. 605) also notes the possibility that guilt could *facilitate* an empathic response and, thereby presumably, a greater likelihood of reparation. It is that possibility that we explore in this research. The correlates of shame have been less studied, though Tangney (1991) reported that shame-proneness was positively correlated with a measure of self-focussed 'personal distress'; this was in marked contrast to the positive correlations between guilt-proneness and the other-focussed empathy measures. Whether these different correlates of guilt and shame reflect different antecedents or different mediating processes of their effects remains unclear. We return to this issue shortly.

GUILT AND SHAME AS GROUP-BASED EMOTIONS

In an important contribution, Smith (1993) argued that when group memberships are salient, people can feel emotions on account of their group's position or treatment, even if they have had little or no personal experience of the actual intergroup situations themselves. Drawn from social identity and self-categorization theories (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), this general hypothesis provided the basis for the first theorizing and research into collective guilt and shame, the emotions that can be felt when it is perceived that one's ingroup (but not necessarily oneself) has mistreated an outgroup.

Following Weiner (1995), several commentators concur in proposing that collective guilt arises mainly when group members perceive that they have some responsibility for, or control over, their ingroup's misdeeds or the subsequent repercussions of those misdeeds (Branscombe, Slugoski, and Kappen, 2004; Leach et al., 2002; Lickel, Schmader, & Barquissau, 2004). There is also some consensus that feelings of collective guilt should generate tendencies to repair the damage done to the outgroup (Branscombe et al., 2004; Lickel et al., 2004). Conceptualizations of collective shame reveal the same ambiguity that can be observed in the interpersonal literature. Thus, Branscombe et al. (2004) write: 'collective shame involves being publicly exposed as incompetent, not being in control, weak and potentially even disgusting *in the eyes of others*' (p. 29; emphasis in the original). Lickel et al. (2004) endorse this 'reputational' view of collective shame but propose that, in addition, shame can derive from an 'essentialist' view of the ingroup (Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000; Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997). In other words, 'collective shame stems from perceiving that the actions of the ingroup confirm or reveal a flawed aspect of one's social identity... (and)... implicate something about the very nature of who they are' (Lickel et al., 2004, pp. 42–43). Despite these differences in emphasis, both accounts clearly hypothesize that collective shame should lead to various kinds of avoidance or distancing behaviours rather than restitution (Branscombe et al., 2004, pp. 30–31; Lickel et al., 2004, p. 47). We are not so sure. For the reasons advanced earlier in discussing feelings of individual shame, we believe it is also possible for the group-image threatening aspects of collective shame to be alleviated by making—or, rather, being seen to make—some kind of reparative gestures. This may only be a temporary expedient and, certainly, to the extent that a more 'essentialist' feeling of shame predominates then, we agree, avoidance rather than reparation should ultimately result. Of course, this novel hypothesis, proposing as it does similar consequences for both collective guilt and shame, threatens to undermine the psychological and pragmatic distinction between them. However, as we argue below, though both emotions might sometimes be associated with equivalent behavioural outcomes, they will do so for different reasons.

If both collective guilt and shame can initiate reparative attitudes, the question then arises as to what may mediate the link between each and reparation. Drawing on research on individual guilt (e.g. Baumeister et al., 1994; Hoffman, 1982; Tangney, 1991; Tangney et al., 2007), we suggest that what links guilt to reparation is empathy for the outgroup. Because collective guilt is focussed mainly on the ingroup's actions towards an outgroup, it should heighten awareness of the negative consequences of those actions for members of that outgroup. This raised awareness of the harm done to the outgroup is likely to generate empathy for the outgroup and thereby to instigate attempts to make restitution for the misdeeds. It is worth noting that Batson, Chang, Orr, and Rowland (2002) found that empathy for a stigmatized group led to increased helping for that group, even if guilt was not investigated in that study. Other arguments in favour of such a link between collective guilt, empathy and prosocial intergroup behaviour have been advanced by Stephan and Finlay (1999) (see, relatedly, Baumeister et al., 1994 and Tangney, 1991 for further evidence relating guilt and empathy in the interpersonal sphere).

We recognize that this line of argumentation is controversial. For instance, Miron, Branscombe, and Schmitt (2006) argue that feelings of personal distress arising from perceptions of illegitimate ingroup superiority rather than empathic concern for the other are the critical antecedents of collective guilt. However, this does not necessarily contradict the argument we are making here. First, because Miron et al. (2006) were concerned with the *antecedents* and not the consequences of guilt. Indeed, we shall provide evidence that is consistent with their position since we too find little evidence for empathy preceding rather than following from the emotion of guilt. Second, it is noteworthy that in their studies Miron et al. (2006) do find at least a bivariate association between empathy and guilt.

Finally, the type of empathy may also be an important factor. As is well known, empathy can have both cognitive and affective components (Batson, 1991; Stephan & Finlay, 1999). The former refers to the ability and willingness to take the perspective of others and thereby experience some of their emotions; the latter is a more direct feeling for the distress of others' plight. Miron et al. (2006) used Batson's (1987) measure which captures more of the affective aspects; in our work we have tended to focus on the cognitive aspects of empathy since, like others (e.g. Baumeister et al., 1994; Tangney, 1991; Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000), we believe that feelings of guilt may be associated with an increased tendency to put oneself in the shoes of the victim group. Furthermore, in the particular highly charged context in which our research was based, we judged that it might still be too early to expect much emotional empathy from the perpetrator group. It is perhaps indicative of the extreme political sensitivity of this research topic amongst Serbs in Bosnia that some students refused to participate on the grounds that they found it illegitimate or inappropriate to be asked to respond to questions about the behaviour of Serbs during the 1992–1995 war.

What of the link between collective shame and reparation? Here, we suggest, the mediating process is different. Collective shame, because it is mainly concerned with the consequences of the ingroup's misdeeds for the group's perceived essential qualities and/or for its own public image, should not be mediated by an other-focussed orientation like empathy but by something more 'inward-looking' like group-based self pity. We conceive of self-pity as an orientation consisting of a belief that the ingroup is the true victim and that one should feel sorry for it rather than the outgroup. Such a reaction might facilitate coping with the situation where members of one's group have harmed the others. Such feelings may be alleviated by attempting some form of reparation, especially if that reparation is to be made in public and can thus serve to improve the ingroup's tarnished reputation. Indeed, there is evidence from another context that the shame-reparation link is partially mediated by such reputation management concerns (Brown, Gonzalez, Zagefka, Manzi, & Cehajic, in press; see also Schmader & Lickel, 2006 for further evidence linking shame to image 'repairing' strategies). Here, though, we are concerned with the more introverted consequence of shame, that it leads people to think and feel badly about themselves and their group. We speculate that temporary relief from that inner distress may be achieved by some reparative gestures to the victim. Although such a process has not yet been investigated in the collective domain, we note that Tangney (1991) found a clear relationship between individual shame-proneness and personal distress, clearly different from the guilt-empathy associations she observed (see also, Tangney et al., 2007).

A first goal of the research reported here was to test these mediational hypotheses.

MEASUREMENT ISSUES

Despite the theoretical interest in the concepts of both collective guilt and shame, until very recently, most measurement efforts have been directed towards guilt and rather less attention has been paid to assessing shame.

A widely used measure of collective guilt was devised by Branscombe et al. (2004). This consists of five items, four of which refer to expressions of regret or guilt over the ingroup's negative actions towards other groups, and one of which refers to a desire to make reparation for any damage caused (see also, Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Pederson, Beven, Walker, & Griffiths, 2004; Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006; Swim & Miller, 1999 for variants of this kind of measure that have been used in different contexts). However, collective shame is not assessed by any of these measures. Research which has tried to measure both guilt and shame, has been conducted by Lickel and his colleagues (Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007; Lickel, Schmader, Curtis, Scarnier, & Ames, 2005; Schmader & Lickel, 2006). In these studies, participants reflect on some event and then record the emotions that this event evoked. Emotion words relating to guilt (e.g. guilty, regretful, remorseful) tend to load together on a separate factor from those associated with shame (e.g. ashamed, embarrassed, disgraced, humiliated) (but cf. Iyer, Crosby, & Leach, 2003 who did not find such a clean separation between guilt and shame-related words, perhaps because of the conflation of these terms in everyday use—Smith et al., 2002).

The lack of a well defined and contextually relevant collective shame measure led Brown et al. (in press) to devise new scales for their work in Chile. In the first two of their studies and consistent with the theoretical distinction between the constructs, guilt items focussed on felt guilt over the treatment of an Indigenous group in Chile, while shame items focussed on perceptions of the ingroup in negative terms because of their continued mistreatment of the Indigenous group. In neither measure was reparation assessed. Factor analysis revealed that these items loaded on two separate—if correlated—factors and the resulting scales had adequate, if not exceptionally high, reliabilities (>.75 for guilt, >.63 for shame). Although these scales proved their worth in both cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses, some further refinement of them seems called for. Their reliabilities might be improved and the shame scale could be elaborated to include not only the existing perceived negative ingroup 'essence' aspect of shame but also the disgraced 'public image' elements (Branscombe et al., 2004; Smith et al., 2002). Accordingly, a second goal of the research reported here was to improve and adapt these first measures for use in the post-war context in which the research was set.

Measures of group-based empathy and self-pity were also needed to test the mediation hypotheses. Consistent with our argument about the guilt-reparation link, we tailored our measure of empathy to focus on perspective-taking. The construct of group-based self-pity has not, to our knowledge, been investigated at a collective level and so a new measure had to be devised. Our objective in doing so was to tap the construct of feeling sorry for the ingroup. Note that this is not the same

thing as 'shame', which is based on a perception of some negative ingroup attributes or a concern for how others see the ingroup.

Finally, what of the presumed outcome of guilt and shame? Theoretically, as we have seen, an outcome of primary importance is the desire to make some form of restitution to the 'harmed' outgroup, whether this be in the form of an apology or some kind of material reparation. Accordingly, a contextually relevant measure of reparation attitudes was devised, adapted from previous research (e.g. Brown et al., in press).

PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON CORRELATES OF COLLECTIVE GUILT AND SHAME

Doosje et al. (1998, Study 2) presented Dutch participants with various accounts of the Dutch colonial treatment of Indonesia. Although these participants had had no direct involvement with the misdeeds they were presented with, they reported moderate levels of guilt for their nation's past and some desire to compensate, and these two measures were positively correlated. Most other research has relied on cross-sectional correlational designs. In four studies in the USA, Swim and Miller (1999) found that European American's guilt consistently predicted reparation in the form of favourable attitudes towards affirmative action policies, and less prejudice towards African Americans. This was supported by Iyer et al. (2003) who also found that guilt was mainly correlated with 'compensatory' forms of affirmative action, and not with equal opportunities policies. The latter form of restitution was better predicted by sympathy for the outgroup. Elsewhere, Leach, Iyer, and Pederson (2006) and McGarty, Pederson, Leach, Mansell, Waller, and Bliuc (2005) found that collective guilt of Non-Indigenous Australians about the treatment of Indigenous Australians was correlated with support for official government apologies to the Indigenous community. Pederson et al. (2004) found that both collective guilt and empathy were negatively associated with prejudice towards Indigenous Australians.

So far, little empirical work has attempted to disentangle the potentially divergent consequences of collective guilt and shame. In an experimental study, Harvey and Oswald (2000) attempted to induce heightened guilt and shame in White Americans by having them watch a video depicting police brutality towards Black children during a civil-rights protest (vs. videos of a White person suffering from Alzheimer's or a neutral documentary on movie-making). The civil-rights video succeeded in increasing feelings of both guilt and shame (compared to the other conditions), and both emotions showed similar relationships to the main dependent measure, support for Black Programmes. Lickel et al. (2005) studied the vicarious emotions aroused by memories of the misdeeds of friends, family members or ethnic groups. In line with Lickel et al.'s (2004) model, although the two emotions were positively correlated, shame was correlated with motives to distance themselves from the perpetrator or the situation and guilt was correlated with motives to apologize and repair. Finally, in two longitudinal studies Brown et al. (in press) found that guilt, but not shame, predicted reparation over time. However, *both* guilt and shame showed independent and positive associations with reparative attitudes contemporaneously. In a subsequent study, Brown et al. (in press) observed that the shame-reparation cross-sectional association was mediated by ingroup reputation management in a way that the guilt-reparation link was not. Recently, Iyer et al. (2007) have investigated shame, guilt and anger in relation to different intentions to protest about the Iraq war. They found that participants' anger was correlated with intentions to confront their governments, compensate Iraqis and withdraw from Iraq. Shame was correlated with a desire to withdraw from Iraq, apparently because of the threat to national image posed by the continued occupation. Guilt, in contrast, had only weak associations with these action tendencies, once the other two emotions were controlled for.

In summary, then, the literature on group-based guilt and shame presents a somewhat confusing picture. Several studies have shown that collective guilt is associated with tendencies to apologize and make restitution to the outgroup. Collective shame has been less investigated. At a cross-sectional level, it can have similar effects on reparation as guilt, although this relationship does not seem to endure over time. Still very little is known about the likely mediators of these effects of guilt and shame on reparation. Finally, no research has yet involved an investigation in the recent aftermath of an intense conflict where, by common consent, war crimes were committed by the 'perpetrator group'. The research we present was conducted in just such a setting in an attempt to contribute further to our understanding of the psychological correlates of guilt and shame.

RESEARCH CONTEXT

The year 2005 marked the 10th anniversary of the ending of the war in Bosnia. The atrocities that occurred in the 1992–1995 war were the worst of their kind to happen in Europe since Second World War (Malcolm, 1994). Those 3 years were characterized by mass killings, rapes and deportation, particularly of a non-Serbian population. Over 250 000 Bosnians lost their lives, over one million left the country and a further 800 000 became refugees in their own land (Bosnian Institute, 2005). The resulting demographic and social transformation of the society has nevertheless left its ethnic proportions unchanged. Bosnia and Herzegovina remains the home of Bosniaks (c. 44%), Serbs (c. 32%), Croats (c. 17%) and other ethnic groups (c. 7%). The Dayton Accords initiated by United States in 1995 brought an end to the war but left the country ‘divided’ into two entities: The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina with majority of Bosnian Muslims and Croats, and The Republic of Srpska with a majority of Bosnian Serbs. Although the activities of OHR (Office of High Commission) are largely dedicated to strengthening and establishing state institutions, each entity has its own government responsible for taxes, education, policing, tourism etc. (OHR, 2005). Such a political structure might be contributing to the community segregation that has occurred after Dayton.

Although relations between Bosniaks and Serbs in the region are still far from harmonious, media coverage of the memorial and burial ceremony in Srebrenica in July, 2005 (BBC News, 2005) and the broadcast in Serbia, Bosnia Herzegovina and elsewhere of video recordings of the Srebrenica massacre in the same month (Oslobodjenje, 2005) have brought issues of collective responsibility for war crimes very much into public discussion amongst Serbs, inside and outside Bosnia Herzegovina. It was against this backdrop that the current studies were conducted. They involved adolescent Bosnian Serbs, who would have been between 4 and 12 years of age at the outbreak of the war in Bosnia, too young to have been directly involved, but old enough to have had some indirect experience through parents and close relatives.

HYPOTHESES

The hypotheses can now be stated:

1. Feelings of collective guilt held by members of a ‘perpetrator group’ should positively predict a wish to make reparation to the ‘victim group’. This relationship will be at least partly mediated by feelings of empathy for the outgroup.
2. Feelings of collective shame in the ‘perpetrator group’ will also positively predict reparation attitudes towards the outgroup. Such an association will be at least partly mediated by feelings of self-pity for the ingroup.

STUDY 1

Method

Participants

One hundred and seventy-three students (M 78, F 94, 1 gender unspecified; age range, 16–24, $M = 18.16$ years) at three high schools in Lukavica and Banja Luka, and at the University of Banja Luka served as participants in class time and on a voluntary basis. They were able to withdraw from the study at any time, an option that a few students did, indeed, choose to exercise. All identified themselves as Serbs. All three headteachers of the participating schools had the authority to act *in loco parentis* to give permission for the students to take part.

Procedure and Measures

The measures were administered via a questionnaire² in the Bosnian language using the Latin alphabet. After a brief explanation of the study on the first page, participants were asked to answer a series of questions regarding the situation in

²There were some other measures included in this questionnaire that are not germane to this paper.

Bosnia and Herzegovina during the war and especially the way Bosnian Muslims had been treated. Extensive debriefing took place immediately after the questionnaire administration.

Collective Guilt This was measured using four items adapted from the scale developed by Brown et al. (in press) (see Table 2). These four items formed a reliable scale (Cronbach's $\alpha = .84$).

Collective Shame This was measured using five items, three adapted from Brown et al. (in press), and two new ones (see Table 2). Note that items 3, 4 and 5 aim to capture the 'reputational' aspect of collective shame, while the other two are more concerned with the negative ingroup 'essence'. These five items formed a reliable scale (Cronbach's $\alpha = .74$).

Empathy This scale consisted of four items which measured an other-oriented emotional response including both the ability and the willingness to take the perspective of the out-group (see Table 2). These four items formed a reliable scale (Cronbach's $\alpha = .81$).

Self-Pity This scale consisted of five new items which measured the degree of self-oriented emotional response focussing on the suffering of the ingroup (see Table 2). These five items formed a less reliable scale (Cronbach's $\alpha = .66$).

Reparation Attitudes to reparation were assessed using five items adapted from Brown et al. (in press) (see Table 2). These items formed a reliable scale (Cronbach's $\alpha = .78$).

With the exception of demographic information (gender, age, place of birth, course of study, education level of parents, ethnicity, nationality and place of living during the war), all items were answered on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 ('strongly disagree') to 7 ('strongly agree').

Results

Preliminary analyses revealed that none of the demographic variables had any significant relationships with the reparation tendencies, either singly or in interaction with other predictors and so these were not included in the analyses presented below.

Table 1 provides a summary of the means, standard deviations and correlations for all the measured variables.

Factor Analysis

In order to establish the empirical distinctiveness of the five main constructs, factor analysis with oblique rotation was performed. This resulted in five distinct factors with an eigenvalue > 1.00 (see Table 2): all four empathy items loaded onto

Table 1. Study 1: correlations, means and standard deviations for measured variables

Variables	1	2	3	4	5
1. Guilt	—	.56***	.48***	.15*	.46***
2. Shame		—	.51***	.32***	.56***
3. Empathy			—	.20***	.50***
4. Self-pity				—	.29***
5. Reparation					—
<i>M</i>	2.12	2.89	2.43	3.62	2.94
<i>SD</i>	1.39	1.46	1.50	1.62	1.44

Notes: $N = 173$.

* $p < .05$; *** $p < .001$; two-tailed.


Table 2. Study 1: factor analysis of all items (loadings < .40 omitted)

Item	1	2	3	4	5
Empathy 1: I am trying to look at things that happened during the war from the perspective of Bosnian Muslims	.84				
Empathy 2: I sometimes think how Bosnian Muslims might have felt during the war	.68				
Empathy 3: I try to imagine what Bosnian Muslims have gone through during the war	.64				
Empathy 4: Usually, I am able to understand Bosnian Muslims point of view	.63				
Self pity 1: Serbs have always been the victims of their national leaders		.74			
Self pity 2: I think Serbs are carrying heavy burden due to things that happened during the war		.73			
Self pity 3: I think that it is Serb's destiny to be perceived as 'bad' people.		.68			
Self pity 4: I think that Serbs have lost faith in themselves due to the things that happened during the war		.46			
Guilt 1: I sometimes feel guilty, for what the Serbs have done to Bosnian Muslims during the war			.85		
Guilt 2: Thinking about some things the Serbs have done in the war, occasionally makes me feel guilty			.80		
Guilt 3: I feel guilty for the human rights violations committed by Serbs during the war			.71		
Guilt 4: Thinking about how Serbs took away homes from Bosnian Muslims makes me feel guilty			.56		
Reparation 1: I believe Serbs should try to repair some of the damage they caused in Bosnia				.85	
Reparation 2: I think that Bosnian Muslims deserve some form of compensation from Serbs for what happened to them during the war				.84	
Reparation 3: I think Serbs owe something to Bosnian Muslims because of the things they have done to them				.65	
Reparation 4: I think that Serbs should help, as much as they can, other group members to return to their homes				.46	
Reparation 5: I think that the government of Serbia was right to apologize to other groups for the past harmful actions committed by Serbs				.44	
Shame 1: The Serbs' past harmful actions towards other groups reflect something negative about Serbian culture					.77
Shame 2: Even though I don't discriminate against Bosnian Muslims, I feel bad when I realize that other Serbs do					.64
Shame 3: It makes me feel bad when I see an international report on the treatment on Bosnian Muslims by Serbs during the war					.55
Shame 4: I feel bad because the way Serbs have treated Bosnian Muslims during the war has created a bad image of Serbian people in the eyes of the world					.54
Shame 5: The way Serbian people are seen today by the rest of the world has become more negative because of the way they behaved during the war					.50
Self pity 5: Sometimes I feel sorry for Serbs and things they have done during the war					

the first factor (loadings .63–.84; 15.41% explained variance); four items aiming to capture self-pity loaded onto the second factor (.46–.74; 13.08% explained variance) while one item 'Sometimes I feel sorry for Serbs and things they have done during the war', did not load on any of the factors. Therefore, this item was excluded from the following analyses even though doing so caused the reliability of the new self-pity scale to drop to .63. All guilt items loaded onto the third factor (.56–.85; 12.38% explained variance); five reparation items loaded onto the fourth factor (.44–.85; 11.43% explained variance) and five shame items loaded onto the fifth factor (.50–.77; 8.87% explained variance). Cross-loadings on other factors were small (all loadings < .40). Altogether this factor analysis accounted for 61.17% of the variance.

SEM

Predictive Model Using EQS 6.1 (Bentler, 1995), we tested a model that represents our argument. Our main hypotheses predict both collective guilt and shame to predict reparation tendencies with empathy mediating guilt-reparation and self-pity mediating the shame-reparation path.



Notes.

n.s. $p > .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

Figure 1. Study 1: Structural equation model. Mediators of collective guilt and shame effects on reparation tendencies

This hypothesized model did not fit the data very well, with a reliable Chi-square value, $\chi^2(2) = 20.67$, $p < .001$. The Lagrange multiplier test for model modification indicated that including a path between shame and empathy would improve the fit of the model. The amended model (allowing for the path between shame and empathy) fitted the data very well, with a small and non-significant Chi-square value, $\chi^2(1) = .16$, $p = .69$. Moreover, other fit indices also indicated an excellent fit: comparative fit-index (CFI) = 1.000, goodness-of-fit index (GFI) = 1.000, root-mean-square of approximation (RMSEA) = .000. Results are reported in Figure 1. As can be seen, all expected paths were significant and strong. We find evidence for the partial mediation of the guilt-reparation link by empathy; Sobel test: $z = 2.51$, $p < .001$. As predicted, we also observed partial mediation of the shame-reparation link by self-pity ($z = 1.99$, $p = .04$). Surprisingly, empathy also seems to have a significant mediating role between shame and reparation ($z = 2.74$, $p < .001$).³

Overall, these results are consistent with our prediction that both guilt and shame can play a role in predicting reparation tendencies, with guilt being mediated by empathy for the outgroup and shame by self-pity for the ingroup and—unexpectedly—by empathy for the outgroup.

Alternative Models Given the possibility that both guilt and shame could arise from an empathic ability to recognize the distress in the other caused by the ingroup's actions, it seems reasonable to test a model in which empathy is regarded as an exogenous variable. In this model, empathy would predict both guilt and shame which in turn would be predicting reparation. In addition, shame effects on reparation are predicted to be mediated by self-pity. This reversed mediation model revealed a much poorer fit with significantly larger Chi-square value, $\chi^2(3) = 12.09$, $p < .01$. Other fit indices indicated also a poorer fit: CFI = .960, GFI = .974 and RMSEA = .133.

In a second alternative model, we tested a reversed mediation model (guilt and shame as mediators of empathy and self-pity effects on reparation). In this model, empathy effects on reparation are expected to be mediated by both guilt and shame whereas self-pity effects are expected to be mediated solely by shame. This reversed mediation model did not provide a reasonable fit with the data either, $\chi^2(3) = 16.53$, $p < .001$ (other fit indices: CFI = .941, GFI = .965, RMSEA = .162).

These results suggest our (revised) model to be superior to both alternative models.

³Given the low reliability of the self-pity scale ($\alpha = .63$), we decided to test our predictive model alternatively using the four self-pity items as indicators of a latent construct. This model, with one latent factor did not fit the data well, with a significant Chi-square, $\chi^2(16) = 37.22$, $p < .001$, although RMSEA = .08. As in the model with all manifest factors, the Lagrange multiplier test for model modification indicated that including the path between shame and empathy would improve the fit of the model. The new model (allowing for the path between shame and empathy) fitted the data very well, with a non-significant Chi-square value, $\chi^2(15) = 19.00$, $p = .21$. Moreover, other fit indices also indicated an excellent fit: CFI = .987; GFI = .973; RMSEA = .04. The path coefficients did not differ significantly from those in the model using self-pity as a manifest factor. Guilt predicted reparation both directly and via empathy felt for the outgroup (indirect effect: $\beta = .18$, $p < .05$). Shame, on the other hand, predicted reparation via both self-pity and empathy (indirect effect: $\beta = .28$, $p < .05$). And finally, empathy and self-pity predicted reparation tendencies ($\beta = .21$, $p < .05$; $\beta = .16$, $p < .05$, respectively).

Discussion

The findings of this study provided clear support for the first two hypotheses. As predicted by Hypothesis 1, feelings of collective guilt for past ingroup misdeeds were positively and strongly associated with a desire to make restitution to the 'victim' outgroup. As expected, this relationship was mediated by self-reported empathy for the outgroup. Hypothesis 2 was also largely supported since collective shame too was positively correlated with reparation attitudes. Self-pity partially mediated that relationship. Unexpectedly, empathy also seemed to mediate the shame-reparation relationship. In discussing these results we would make the following additional remarks.

As we have seen, both collective guilt and shame predicted reparation attitudes. The finding for guilt is consistent with existing theory and most previous research in this area (e.g. Branscombe et al., 2004; Brown et al., in press; Doosje et al., 1998; Iyer et al., 2003; Lickel et al., 2004; Swim & Miller, 1999). There seems little doubt that one way that group members can cope with the aversive nature of collective guilt is to 'make it up to' the outgroup in some fashion. That collective shame may also be 'alleviated' in the same way is a more innovative finding since most commentators suggest that distancing or avoidance are more likely consequences of feeling ashamed (Branscombe et al., 2004; Lickel et al., 2004). Still, there seems little doubt that, in the short-term at least, collective shame *is* positively related to reparation. The results obtained here mirror perfectly those obtained in the very different context of Chile where, again, cross-sectionally (but not longitudinally) shame predicted reparation attitudes independently of guilt (Brown et al., in press). As we argued earlier, one reason for such a shame-reparation link could be that appearing to want to make restitution to the victim group is a way of improving the besmirched public image of the ingroup (see Brown et al., in press).

The results from our mediation analyses lend some support to that contention. Note that a mediator of the shame-reparation link was self-pity, an emotional state that is unlikely to give rise to long-term positive attitudes towards the outgroup. This same mediator was completely absent from the guilt-reparation relationship where, instead, empathy figured more prominently. Since empathy is an essentially other-focussed orientation, it seems much more likely to generate positive sentiments towards the 'victim' group and thus engender genuine attempts at restitution. Note, however, that an alternative model in which empathy *preceded* both guilt and shame provided a poorer fit with the data.

Contrary to expectation, empathy was also found significantly to mediate the shame-reparation link. In other words, shame, an inward-focussed emotion, seems also to be sometimes correlated with empathy, a decidedly other-focussed orientation. Although any explanation for this relationship is necessarily speculative at this stage, it is possible that to be seen to be endorsing items expressing empathy for the outgroup might conceivably contribute to the same image-repairing function as endorsing the reparation attitude items.

STUDY 2

In view of the novelty of our now empirically supported shame-reparation hypothesis, it seemed sensible to seek further replicative evidence with another study. In this second study, we also sought to refine our measure of collective shame so it more accurately captured the 'reputational' aspects of shame which are central to our hypothesis. Thus, in this study, also conducted in Bosnia Herzegovina with Serb adolescents, we devised a measure of shame which focuses specifically on the perceived damage done to the Serbian public image by the war crimes committed in the 1992–1995 conflict. In other respects the measures and design were identical to that of Study 1.

Method

Participants

Two hundred and forty-seven participants (M 94, F 143, 10 gender unspecified; age range 16–20, $M = 17.91$) at two high schools in Pale and Lukavica served as participants in class time and on a voluntary basis. All identified themselves as Serbs. Headteachers of the schools, acting *in loco parentis*, gave their permission for the students to take part.

Table 3. Study 2: correlations, means and standard deviations for measured variables

Variables	1	2	3	4	5
1. Guilt	—	.58***	.48***	.21***	.49***
2. Shame		—	.62***	.50***	.65***
3. Empathy			—	.44***	.59***
4. Self-pity				—	.44***
5. Reparation					—
<i>M</i>	2.43	3.36	3.88	3.85	2.91
<i>SD</i>	1.57	1.78	1.79	1.55	1.55

Notes: $N = 247$.

*** $p < .001$; two-tailed.

Procedure and Measures

With an exception of the shame measure, all other measures and the design were identical to that of Study 1.

The new shame measure aimed to capture the perceived damaged group's image (reputation) as an important ingredient of collective shame. This new scale consisted of three items from Study 1 and two new ones (see Table 4). Note that the second to last item includes a face-valid expression of shame feelings. These five items formed a reliable scale (Cronbach's $\alpha = .86$).

Results

Preliminary analyses revealed that none of the demographic variables had any significant relationships with the reparation tendencies, either singly or in interaction with other predictors and so these were not included in the analyses presented below.

Table 3 provides a summary of the means, standard deviations and correlations for all the measured variables. The bivariate correlations replicated those in Study 1.

Factor Analysis

In order to establish the distinctiveness of the five main constructs, factor analysis with oblique rotation was performed (Table 4). This resulted in five distinct factors with eigenvalues > 1.00 : all five shame items loaded onto the first factor (loadings .53–.84; 16.50% explained variance; Cronbach's $\alpha = .86$); all four guilt items loaded onto the second factor (.70–.86; 15.83% explained variance; Cronbach's $\alpha = .88$); all five reparation items loaded onto the third factor (.41–.82; 15.27% explained variance; Cronbach's $\alpha = .87$); all four empathy items onto the fourth factor (.67–.87; 12.71% explained variance; Cronbach's $\alpha = .87$); and four items aiming to capture self-pity loaded onto the fifth factor (.41–.85; 7.11% explained variance), while one item 'Sometimes I feel sorry for Serbs and things they have done during the war', loaded on the empathy factor (loading .45). Although we acknowledge that this item reflects some form of empathy, we note that here the orientation is towards the *ingroup* and not the *outgroup* as it is for the empathy items. Therefore, we decided to exclude that item from the following analyses even though the reliability of the new self-pity scale dropped from .67 to .58 as a result. Cross-loadings on other factors were small (all $< .40$). The analysis accounted for 67.42 % of the variance.


SEM

Predictive Model Using EQS 6.1, we again set up our original predictive model (see Figure 2). The hypothesized model did not fit the data very well, with a high and reliable Chi-square value, $\chi^2(2) = 63.33$, $p < .001$. Again, the

Table 4. Study 2 factor analysis of all items (loadings < .40 omitted)

Item	1	2	3	4	5
Shame 1: The way Serbian people are seen today by the rest of the world has become more negative because of the way they behaved during the war	.84				
Shame 2: I feel bad because the way Serbs have treated Bosnian Muslims during the war has created a bad image of Serbian people in the eyes of the world	.69				
Shame 3: Things committed by Serbs are a big black mark in our history	.63				
Shame 4: Sometimes I feel ashamed of how others might look at or think of us	.62				
Shame 5: It makes me feel bad when I see an international report on the treatment on Bosnian Muslims by Serbs during the war	.53				
Guilt 1: I feel guilty for the human rights violations committed by Serbs during the war	.86				
Guilt 2: I sometimes feel guilty, for what the Serbs have done to Bosnian Muslims during the war	.83				
Guilt 3: Thinking about some things the Serbs have done in the war, occasionally makes me feel guilty	.77				
Guilt 4: Thinking about how Serbs took away homes from Bosnian Muslims makes me feel guilty	.70				
Reparation 1: I believe Serbs should try to repair some of the damage they caused in Bosnia		.82			
Reparation 2: I think that Bosnian Muslims deserve some form of compensation from Serbs for what happened to them during the war		.78			
Reparation 3: I think Serbs owe something to Bosnian Muslims because of the things they have done to them		.66			
Reparation 4: I think that the government of Serbia was right to apologize to other groups for the past harmful actions committed by Serbs		.55			
Reparation 5: I think that Serbs should help, as much as they can, other group members to return to their homes		.41			
Empathy 1: I try to imagine what Bosnian Muslims have gone through during the war			.87		
Empathy 2: I sometimes think how Bosnian Muslims might have felt during the war			.85		
Empathy 3: I am trying to look at things that happened during the war from the perspective of Bosnian Muslims			.74		
Empathy 4: Usually, I am able to understand Bosnian Muslims point of view			.67		
Self-pity 1: Sometimes I feel sorry for Serbs and things they have done during the war			.45		
Self pity 2: I think that it is Serb's destiny to be perceived as 'bad' people				.85	
Self pity 3: I think that Serbs have lost faith in themselves due to the things that happened during the war				.53	
Self pity 4: Serbs have always been the victims of their national leaders				.44	
Self pity 5: I think Serbs are carrying heavy burden due to things that happened during the war				.41	

Lagrange multiplier test for model modification indicated that including the path between shame and empathy would improve the fit of the model. The revised model fitted the data very well, with a small and only marginally significant Chi-square value, $\chi^2(1) = 3.21, p = .07$. Moreover, other fit indices also indicated a good fit (CFI = .995, GFI = .995, RMSEA = .08). As can be seen from Figure 2, both collective guilt and shame predicted reparation strongly, with the



Notes.

n.s. $p > .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

Figure 2. Study 2: Structural equation model. Mediators of collective guilt and shame effects on reparation tendencies

guilt-reparation link being mediated by empathy ($z = 2.45, p < .01$), and shame-reparation being mediated by both self-pity and empathy ($z = 2.79, p < .001$; $z = 3.99, p < .001$, respectively).⁴

The results of Study 1 were thus perfectly replicated.

Alternative Models We then set up two alternative models, as in Study 1. The first alternative model, in which empathy predicted guilt and shame, did not fit the data very well, $\chi^2(3) = 30.58, p < .001$ (CFI = .940, GFI = .953, RMSEA = .197). The second alternative model (reversed mediation), in which empathy and self-pity effects on reparation were mediated by guilt and shame, also proved to have a poor fit with a high and reliable Chi-square value, $\chi^2(3) = 24.27, p < .001$ (CFI = .954, GFI = .962, RMSEA = .173). These results indicate our model to be superior to both alternative models (as in Study 1).

Discussion

The results of Study 2 closely matched those from Study 1 and provided valuable additional support for both hypotheses. Around half the variance in the reparation measure was explained by the final model and it is noteworthy that the same pattern of relationships was observed with the new collective shame scale, which was a 'cleaner' and more face-valid measure of the 'reputational' aspect of shame since it consisted only of items interrogating participants' feelings about appearing bad in the eyes of others. This reinforces our hypothesis that, to the extent that such 'image' aspects dominate in group members' feelings of shame, then reparation can, indeed, be a way of attempting to salvage the ingroup's reputation and hence lessen those negative feelings.

Note also that one of the data collection sites for Study 2 was in a town not sampled in Study 1. The fact that similar findings were obtained from such a diversity of locations within Republika Srpska and with reasonably representative samples of high school Serb students provides reassuring evidence for their robustness.

The unexpected link between collective shame and empathy found in Study 1 was also replicated. A possible explanation for this is discussed below.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The results from these two studies are both clear and consistent. The emotions of collective shame and collective guilt are both associated with a desire to make reparation to the outgroup. As predicted, guilt is linked to reparation through empathy for the outgroup but not through self-pity; shame is linked to reparation through self-pity but also via empathy. Various other configurations of these variables were explored but none fitted the data as well as the one we have presented.

We believe that the research reported here makes several contributions to the burgeoning literature on group-based emotions. First, it provides a further demonstration that collective guilt over an ingroup's misdeeds will usually be associated with attempts to repair the damage caused by those misdeeds. Although this association has been reported before (e.g. Doosje et al., 1998; Iyer et al., 2003; McGarty, Pederson, Leach, Mansell, Waller, & Bliuc, 2005), this is the first time that it has been observed in the aftermath of a recent and severe intergroup conflict. Moreover, we have shown that this guilt-reparation relationship is mediated by an empathic orientation to the outgroup. Previous theory and research

⁴Given the low reliability of the self-pity scale ($\alpha = .58$), we again decided to test our predictive model using the four self-pity items as indicators of a latent construct. This model, with one latent factor did not fit the data well, with a reliable Chi-square value, $\chi^2(16) = 80.38, p < .001$. As in the model with all manifest factors, the Lagrange multiplier test for model modification indicated that including the path between shame and empathy would improve the fit of the model. The revised model fitted the data well, with a marginally significant chi-square, $\chi^2(15) = 23.06, p = .08$. Moreover, other fit indices also indicated a good fit: CFI = .985; GFI = .975; RMSEA = .04. The path coefficients did not differ much from those in the model using self-pity as a manifest factor. Guilt predicted reparation both directly and via empathy felt for the outgroup (indirect effect: $\beta = .12, p < .05$). Shame, on the other hand, predicted reparation via both self-pity and empathy (indirect effect: $\beta = .27, p < .05$). And finally, empathy and self-pity predicted reparation tendencies ($\beta = .18, p < .05$; $\beta = .19, p < .05$, respectively).

has linked guilt and empathy (e.g. Baumeister et al., 1994; Tangney, 1991; Tangney et al., 2007) but has not shown how that association is also connected to reparation.

Second, we have confirmed that collective shame can also be associated with reparation (see also Brown et al., in press for similar findings). Although previous theorizing has not predicted such a relationship, we believe that it is perfectly comprehensible once one recognizes that feelings of shame often centre on concerns for the ingroup's public reputation. In Study 1, our measure of shame partly comprised this reputational aspect; in Study 2 it did so completely. In both cases there was an unambiguous correlation with reparation attitudes. As we argued earlier, we believe that such a correlation reflects an attempt by ingroup members to alleviate their feelings of shame by attempting some kind of public rehabilitation for themselves, a conclusion borne out by mediation analyses of the shame-reparation link performed by Brown et al. (in press).

A third contribution of the research is to point to potential mediators of the shame-reparation relationship. As we had hypothesized, one such mediator was clearly self-pity. In both studies, heightened shame was associated with feeling sorry for the ingroup and thence to wish to make some (public) reparation. Note that this inward-directed process is rather different from the more other-directed nature of the guilt-reparation pattern above. An unexpected finding, observed in both studies, was that empathy too was implicated in the shame-reparation nexus. One speculative explanation for this relationship is that it reflects something of the same impression management process that we hypothesize underlies the shame-reparation association. The Serb participants may have believed that their group could be seen in a better light if they claimed to be empathizing with the Bosniak outgroup. Of course, we recognize that this same motivation might be underlying the links between guilt, empathy and reparation. However, neither Brown et al. (in press) nor Schmader and Lickel (2006) could find much evidence of such a link between guilt and reputation management. Thus, at this point, it seems reasonable to conclude that guilt and shame do operate rather differently. Further research, possibly of an experimental nature, would obviously be needed to substantiate these ideas.

If shame is linked to reparation cross-sectionally as strongly as is guilt—even if for different reasons—does this suggest that it will have the same consequences in the longer term? We suspect not. To the extent that shame stems from a perception either of the ingroup's negative 'essence' or from its negative public reputation, we think it unlikely that it will consistently motivate reparation attempts. Over time, it may prove easier to cope with shame emotions either by one-off reparation gestures (as here) or by subsequent denial and avoidance. The results from two longitudinal studies where shame failed to predict reparation attitudes over periods from 2 to 6 months whilst guilt did, provide some support for this idea (Brown et al., in press).

Of course, the cross-sectional design of our studies imposes some restrictions on how we can interpret our findings. Inferences of causality are especially tenuous with such a design, suggesting that more longitudinal research of the kind initiated by Brown et al. (in press) is necessary. Such longitudinal work would be especially helpful to clarify the role and causal priority of our presumed mediators, empathy and self-pity. So far, we have assumed that feeling guilty or ashamed for what one's group has done generates either an empathic or a self-pitying orientation, because of the different primary focus of the guilt and shame emotions—the former on the ingroup's *actions* and their consequences, the latter on the ingroup's *essence* or *reputation*. However, it is possible to argue, as Hoffman (1982) and Tangney (1991) have done in the interpersonal domain that empathy and, by extension, self-pity actually *precede* the emotions of guilt and shame. In other words, what gives rise to these self-conscious emotions is a prior tendency to take the perspective of the other group or to dwell unduly on one's ingroup's failings. However, there was little evidence for such a causal ordering in our studies since such models did not fit the data well. Moreover, Miron et al. (2006) also could find little evidence for empathy as an antecedent of collective guilt. Still, it must be acknowledged that these findings all stem from cross-sectional correlational data. What might help to disentangle these different causal orders would be at least a three stage longitudinal design in which presumed predictors, mediators and outcome variables are measured at all time points. Alternatively, an experimental approach might be adopted.

Finally, we wish to reflect on the possible applied implications of our findings. Given the recency of the violent conflict in Bosnia and the still fraught intergroup relations there, this should not be seen as the usual platitudinous conclusion to a research paper but represents an urgent task for those involved in the post-war reconciliation process. From our perspective, it seems clear that some awareness and sense of past ingroup culpability by members of a 'perpetrator' group is a necessary preliminary towards restitution and subsequent intergroup reconciliation (Gilbert, 2001; Lederach, 1997; Minow, 1998; Tutu, 1999). Thus, such consciousness-raising in school curricula and other public educational forums could be a useful first step. However, such a policy is not without its dangers. It is possible that too many reminders of ingroup

malfeasances could transform the emotion of collective guilt with its apparently positive social consequences into the more inward-looking emotion of collective shame which, in the long term, may have less beneficial outcomes (Tangney et al., 2007). One way out of this dilemma might be to concentrate educational and other interventions on developing and increasing empathy for the other group. As we have seen, empathy seems to be reliably associated with both reparation attitudes and approach tendencies. An effective way to bring this about is through programmes of structured intergroup contact. In a recent review, Brown and Hewstone (2005) concluded that one way that contact works is through enhancing empathy for the outgroup. Indeed, in related research in Bosnia we have found that contact under the right conditions generates increased trust, and thereby a greater tendency towards forgiveness (Cehajic, Brown, & Castano, in press). Bringing together members of the conflicting groups might not only enhance perspective-taking for the suffering of the other but also contribute to the process of restoring intergroup trust, hence rebuilding damaged intergroup relations. However, the process of beneficial intergroup contact requires not only a genuine engagement with the other side but also a willingness to take responsibility for the ingroup's actions, even if one was not directly involved. Other research indicates that such an attitude is more likely to lead to feelings of collective guilt whilst, in contrast, a concern with the ingroup's damaged reputation is a more likely antecedent of shame (Cehajic & Brown, 2007). In any event, as the results of these studies show, reparation of intergroup relationships seems to benefit from the awareness of the group's misdeeds and the specific emotions that might arise as a consequence of that rather painful realization. Thus, dealing with the past may be a necessary first step for building a more peaceful future.

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